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cause of action will not lie based upon the injury inflicted prior to the
amendment. The court held that such an application of the statute would
be retroactive and contrary to the Constitution. Since there was no ex-
pression of legislative intent that the statute be applied retroactively, the
court had no occasion to consider the question of whether any vested rights
would be affected by such an application. "
CONCLUSION
The problem posed by the Montana Legislature is not an easy one.
There are many facets of the problem which will require the Montana
court to exercise sound judgment in an attempt to achieve the legislative
expression of intent and to effectuate paramount policy choices. It is a
general rule that the legislative expression of intent must be given con-
trolling force if possible. The Montana court expressed this rule in
Tipton v. Sands :'
Every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of legislative
action. The court must determine not whether it is possible to
condemn, but whether it is possible to uphold the Act which is at-
tacked; every presumption being in favor of its validity.
It is submitted that the court can achieve this end in the manner in-
dicated above. The court need not fear that a deteration that the statute
is procedural for purposes of the constitutional question of retroactive
application binds it to this determination for all questions which might
arise in the future. As noted by Professor Cook, the distinction between
substantive and procedural law is "drawn for a number of different pur-
poses, each involving its own social, economic, or political problems.' m
The Montana court has previously held the survival statute to be pro-
cedural.'" Public policy, coupled with the court's prior decision and the
legislative intent provide the court with a solid basis for such a decision.
The court should find the statute to be procedural, at least for purposes
of retroactive application. This would not be an eneroachment upon con-
stitutional safeguards.
ROBERT G. ANDERSON
ROADBLOOKS AND THE LAW OF ARREST IN MONTANA
INTRODUCTION
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 94-6030 provides:
The duly elected or appointed law enforcement officers of this
state, and their deputies, are hereby authorized to establish,...
temporary roadblocks on the highways of this state for the purpose
of identifying drivers, and apprehending persons wanted for viola-
"I1bid.
'103 Mont. 1, 16, 60 P.2d 662, 669 (1966)..
."Cook, "Substance" and "Prooedure" in the ConfUct of Laws, 42 YAi L.J. 333, 342
(1932-33).-
"Dillon v. Great No. Ry., supra note 65.
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tions of the laws of this state, or of any other state, or of the United
States, who are using the highways of this state.
Section 94-6030 is framed in broad and general terms and appears to grant
the law enforcement officials of this state unlimited authority to establish
roadblocks. This presents several important constitutional questions rela-
tive to the law of arrest. It is the object of this article to delineate, as far
as possible, the law of arrest and to illustrate why and how it should limit
section 94-6030.
At the outset a brief resume of the law of arrest will be helpful. The
basic rule is that before there can be a lawful arrest there must be probable
cause to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing an of-
fense.1
The Supreme Court of the United States has impliedly held that if an
officer, with probable cause, stops a vehicle in order to search it, an arrest
of the driver does not necessarily result.' The right of an officer to stop and
question, as an act separate from an arrest, an individual abroad is recog-
nized by the majority of courts so long as reasonable grounds for an in-
vestigation are present. The majority of courts, using this same reasoning,
allow the stopping of an automobile and the questioning of occupants as an
act separate from an arrest, provided that reasonable grounds for investiga-
tion are present." However, the stopping of an individual abroad on mere
suspicion is not permissible. This constitutes a departure from an objective
standard and places reliance solely on the subjective intent of the officer.
Where the officer stops a vehicle at a general roadblock, there is not even
a suspicion on the part of the officer, for he is relying merely on the "law
of averages," i.e., that out of a given number of cars stopped there is likely
to be discovered a cerain number of violations of the law.
WHAT IS AN ARREST?
At the outset it must be recognized that the term "arrest" is not sub-
ject to precise definition. There is no set formula which can be applied
in every case to determine just when an arrest has taken place. The peculiar
circumstances of each case are important in ascertaining the ultimate scope
1U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized." U.S. CONST, AMEND. XIV, § 1: "No state shall . . . de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
MoNT. CoNsT., Ar. III, J 7: "Thepeople shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to
search any place or seize any person or thing shall issue without describing the
place to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writings." MONT. CONST., ART. III, § 27:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law."
Probable cause has been defined to exist when the facts and circumstances
known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that an offense has been
or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925) ; Henry
v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959).
2Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
'E.g., Jenkins v. United States, 161 F.2d 99 (10th Cir. 1947) ; Busby v. United States,
296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961) ; People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956).
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of the term. An arrest has been defined as a taking, seizing, or detaining
of the person of another.' It has been defined as the apprehension or de-
tention of the person of another in order that he may be forthcoming to
answer for an alleged or supposed crime.' It has also been defined as the
taking of a person into custody. At times the courts have attempted to
specify the basic requirements of an arrest: (1) a purpose to take the per-
son into the custody of the law; (2) under real or pretended authority;
(3) an actual or constructive seizure or detention of his person; and, (4)
so understood by the person arrested.' The area of greatest dispute and
with which this article is primarily concerned is the third, i.e., an actual
or constructive seizure or detention of the person. This may be accom-
plished by touching or putting hands on the person or by an act that indi-
cates an intention to take him into custody8 and that subjects him to the
actual control and will of the person making the arrest.! There can be no
arrest where the person sought to be arrested is not conscious of the re-
straint.0 The problem is how much interference with freedom of movement
is allowable before a technical arrest occurs. When an officer detains a
person for the purpose of questioning him, does this constitute an arrest,
and if not, at what point is a legal arrest made?
REQUIREMENT OF PROBATE CAUSE
The Constitution of the United States' and of the state of Montana!'
require a showing of probable cause before a warrant of arrest may be is-
sued. In the case of an arrest without a warrant, Montana legalizes an ar-
rest of one who has in fact committed a felony without a showing of prob-
able cause.' In all other cases, Montana requires probable cause when there
is an arrest without a warrant, except where the offense is committed in the
'Harrer v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont. 295, 221 P.2d 428 (1950) ; Jenkins v.
United States, supra note 3; Hoppes v. State, 70 Okla. Crim. 179, 105 P.2d 433
(1940).
'Patterson v. United States, 192 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 343 U.S. 951(1952) ; Cornish v. State, 215 Md. 64, 137 A.2d 170 (1957) ; Rhodes v. Walsh, 55
Minn. 542, 57 N.W. 212 (1893) ; Hoppes v. State, supra note 4; Wyatt v. State, 120
Tex. Crim. 3, 47 S.W.2d 827 (1932) ; State v. Phillips, 262 Wis. 303, 55 N.W.2d 384
(1952).
OUnited States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds,
285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
'State ex rel. Sadler v. Dist. Ct., 70 Mont. 378, 225 Pac. 1000 (1924) ; Harrer v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., supra note 4; Some courts do not list the second element, e.g.,
under real or pretended authority, as one of the basic elements which must be
present before there can be an arrest, but their decisions show that this is a re-
quisite. Jenkins v. United States, supra note 3; People v. Foster, 176 N.E.2d 397
(1961).
Harrer v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra note 4; Rhodes v. Walsh, supra note 5;
Hoppes v. State, supra note 4; State v. Phillips, supra note 5.
'Harrer v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra note 4; Hoppes v. State, 8supra note 4;
State v. Phillips, supra note 5: State ex rel. Sadler v. Dist. Ct., supra note 7. The
court in the Sadler case requires an actual touching of the person to be arrested
before there is an arrest. The case is subj.ect to criticism on this point.
'Harrer v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra note 4; State v. Williams, 237 S.C. 252,
116 S.E.2d 858 (1960).
"Supra note 1.
"S8upra note 1.
'REvsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 94-6003(2). Mason, Arrests Without a Warrant
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presence of the officer.1" Thus, if there is no right, as an act separate from
an arrest, to stop and question, whenever an officer stops a person for ques-
tioning there is presumptively an arrest and probable cause must be estab-
lished before this detention occurs or the police officer's action will be il-
legal." It is obvious that an officer may ask an individual a question
without there being an arrest so long as he does not confine or restrain the
individual without his consent." The problem arises when an officer with-
out probable cause for an arrest restrains an individual by force or display
of authority for a brief period of time for the purpose of questioning.
RIGHT TO STOP AND QUESTION
AS AN ACT SEPARATE FROM AN ARREST
In Carroll v. United States" the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized the right of a law enforcement official to stop and search a
vehicle on the basis of probable cause to believe that it was carrying con-
traband although there was not present the necessary probable cause to
support an arrest of the driver. The court allowed the search because of
the mobility of the automobile and the quickness with which it can be moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction. Thus, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the stopping of a vehicle for the purpose of searching it does not
necessarily constitute an arrest of the driver.
The courts are in disagreement regarding the right of a law enforce-
ment official to stop and question, as an act separate from an arrest, an
individual abroad where there are reasonable grounds for investigation.
They may be divided into three groups:' (1) courts where the right to
stop and question, as an act separate from an arrest, has typically been
recognized ;' (2) courts which, although not having considered the question
fully, have given an indication that there may be a recognized right to stop
and question, as an act separate from an arrest, under some circumstances
when an arrest would be improper;' and, (3) courts which refuse to recog-
nize any right to stop and question apart from an authorized arrest.'
-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6003 (1), (3), (4), (5).
"Shirey v. State, 321 P.2d 981 (Okla. Crim. 1958) ; United States v. Scott, 149 F.
Supp. 837 (D.D.C.. 1957). Cf. Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633
(1947). The Tennessee court in dicta stated that the stopping of a car to check a
driver's license constituted an arrest although the restraint may be just momentary
in some cases. The arrest is said to be excusable because of revenue necessities
and the protection of the public against unqualified or dangerous drivers. The
court at no point discusses probable cause and even infers that in such a case
probable cause is not necessary for there to be a legal arrest. The case is probably
erroneous on this point.
"Note, Arrest-Stopping and Questioning as an Arrest, 37 MIcH. L. REv. 311 (1938).
17,upra note.2.
"This grouping of the courts is merely representative. It is not intended to be a
comprehensive classification.
'Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 Pac. 43 (1908) ; People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d
645; 290 P.2d 531 (195) ; People v. Jackson, 164 Cal. App. 2d 759, 331 P.2d 63
(1958) ; People v. Ambrose, 164 Cal. App. 2d 513, 318 P.2d 181 (1957) ; People v.
Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956). In all these cases the circumstances
were such that there is no doubt that reasonable grounds for an investigation were
present.
2People v. Henneman, 367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E.2d 649 (1937) ; State v. Hatfield, 112 W.
Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932) ; State v. Guleznski, 32 Del. 120, 120 At. 88 (1922).
'People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 194 N.Y. Supp. 326 (1922) ; Arnold v. State, 255
App. Div. 422, 8 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1938) ; Shirey v. State, supra note 15.
[Vol. 24,
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 24 [1962], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol24/iss2/3
Section 2 of The Uniform Arrest Act' recognizes the right to stop and
question where there are "reasonable grounds to suspect. "' If the person
so questioned refuses to answer or explain his actions to the satisfaction of
the officer, he may be detained and further questioned and investigated for
a period not exceeding two hours.2' The two hour limitation prevents the
detention from being transferred into imprisonment ex communicado with-
out the safeguards of arrest.
The classic California case in this area is Gisske v. Sander? where the
court stated :'
... A police has a right to make inquiry in a proper manner of
anyone upon the public streets at a late hour as to his identity and
the occasion of his presence, if the surroundings are such as to indi-
cate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identi-
fication. (Emphasis added.)
The court recognized that there must be present reasonable grounds for in-
vestigation and that the inquiry must be in a proper manner. This pre-
vents an officer from lawfully stopping an individual on the basis of whim
or caprice.
The majority of the federal cases support the right to stop and ques-
tion, as an act separate from an arrest.' The district court in United
States v. Bonannoe held that if individuals are stopped for questioning
while leaving a gathering of known criminals, there has been no arrest. The
circuit court reversed the case on other grounds. Judge Clark, in a con-
curring opinion,2 stated that the ruling of the district court was at vari-
ance with the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Henry v.
United States' and the rationale contained therein. The Henry case dealt
TiHE UNIFORM ARREST ACT, § 2:
(1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad whom he has reasonable
grounds to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a
crime, and may demand of him his name, address, business abroad and
whither he is going.
(2) Any person so qjuestioned who fails to identify himself or explain
his actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further
questioned and investigated.
(3) The total period of detention provided by this section shall not ex-
ceed two hours. Such detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded
as an arrest in any official record. At the end of the detention the person
so detained shall be released or be arrested and charged with a crime.
Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rh'v. 315, 325 (1942).
'Supra note 22.
21'Ibi4.
79 Cal. app. 13, 98 Pac. 43 (1908).
"Id. at 16, 98 Pac. at 45.
2THusty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) ; Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328(9th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd
on other grounds, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960). Cf., Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925). In the Carroll case the court recognized the right of those lawfully
within this country to use the highways without interruption or search unless there
is probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise. But see Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1934), where the
court declared: ".... the term arrest may be applied to any case where a person is
taken into custody or restrained of his full liberty, or where the detention of a
person in custody is continued for even a short period of time."
Supra note 27.
"United States v. Bonanno, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. i960).80361 U.S. 98 (1959).
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with the stopping of a car without probable cause for an arrest, its search,
and the seizure of contraband goods found therein. The evidence was re-
jected by the court as having been obtained through a search and seizure
stemming from an illegal arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed this deci-
sion, but based its affirmance upon the government's unnecessary con-
cession that the arrest had taken place when the federal officers stopped
the car.' Due to this concession, the decision was narrow in scope, turning
on the question of probable cause to arrest at the moment the vehicle was
stopped. Apparently Judge Clark erroneously interpreted the Henry case
as standing for the proposition that law enforcement officers must have
probable cause to arrest before they can lawfully stop an automobile. This
position might arguably be supported by a statement of the United States
Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States :'
... those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public
highways, have a right to free passage without interruption . . .
unless there is ... probable cause for believing that their vehicles
are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.
A careful reading of this statement shows that the court permitted a
vehicle to be stopped on the basis of probable cause for a search and did
not require probable cause for an arrest. If stopping a vehicle for the pur-
pose of search is not an arrest, it would appear that the stopping of a
vehicle for the purpose of interrogation or identification of the occupants
is still further removed from a technical arrest. But one important dis-
tinction must be made. That is, the stopping of a vehicle in order to
search it must be based on probable cause.' If the right to stop a vehicle
for purpose of interrogation or identification of the occupants is limited
to those instances when reasonable grounds for investigation are present,
it would be constitutionally permissible." The extreme mobility of a
vehicle, which was the crucial factor in allowing the search of a vehicle
on the basis of probable cause,' is an important element in allowing the
stopping of a vehicle on the basis of reasonable grounds for investigation.
Also, the reasoning of those courts which allow the stopping of an in-
dividual abroad where reasonable grounds for investigation exist would
be equally applicable to the stopping of an automobile.
ROADBLOCKS
The establishment of a general roadblock for the purpose of checking
drivers' licenses has been justified as a valid exercise of the police power
for protection of the citizenry by attempting to remove the unqualified
driver from the highways.' The toll of traffic deaths and injuries is the
public necessity which makes such an interference with the motorists' free-
dom of movement permissible.
'Id. at 171.




wAronovity v. City of Miami, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959) ; Commonwealth v. Mitchell,
355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962).
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The courts have refused to allow police officers to use the device of
stopping to check drivers' licenses as a mere subterfuge for conducting a
detailed search of the vehicle.' As the court in Aronvitz v. City of Miami'
stated :0
Other states ... have impliedly recognized the propriety of stop-
ping vehicles for driver's license inspection. Similarily many of
these courts have condemned the idea of employing the driver's li-
cense inspection merely as a surreptitious subterfuge for em-
barrassing a motorist and making a detailed search of his automo-
bile without cause to believe that the law is being violated or in the
absence of a violation in the presence of the officer.
Even with this limitation, a roadblock allegedly established for the pur-
pose of driver's license inspection is likely to be primarily established for
a chance finding of other and more important violations of the law. With
such an uncontrolled avenue of abuse open to law enforcement officials,
it is submitted that the public interest would be better served by prohibit-
ing the establishment of roadblocks for the purported purpose of checking
drivers' licenses. Section 94-6030 is not limited to the checking of drivers'
licenses but on the surface allows the establishment of a general roadblock
for the purpose of a chance finding of any violation of the law.
The stopping of vehicles to apprehend a wanted criminal or for the
purpose of investigating a serious crime which has been committed is recog-
nized as a valid exercise of the police power. In United States v. Bonanno'
Judge Kaufman discussed at some length this question and felt that if
every detention of a person was held to be within the protection of the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, police in-
vestigation would be dealt a crippling blow by imposing a radical sanction
unnecessary for the protection of the citizenry. He might well have stated
this proposition in reverse form. That is, such a right, subject to certain
limitations, is necessary for the protection of a free citizenry. A police of-
ficer should be allowed to question everyone leaving the scene of a suspected
crime, even if it is obvious that all of the persons could not have committed
the crime. Judge Kaufman argued that there is more justification for
stopping a car leaving the vicinity of a suspected crime because if action
is not taken immediately there may not be another opportunity.c In sup-
port of his position, he cited the concurring opinion of Justice Burton in
Brinegar v. United States" that law enforcement officers could take af-
firmative action not only where there are reasonable grounds for an arrest
or probable cause to search, but when there are reasonable grounds for in-
vestigation.
Also in the Brinegar case," Justice Jackson, though dissenting, sug-
gested the propriety of setting up a roadblock around the scene of a kid-
napping and stopping all cars seeking to pass through, even though it would
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be clear that most of the cars stopped could have nothing to do with the
criminal activity. However, he would not extend the use of the roadblock
to stopping of a bootlegger to see if he was carrying liquor. Justice Jack-
son-would seemingly base the propriety of a roadblock on the seriousness
of the crime and the possible injury to the public if the roadblock were not
used. This position is sound. It does not fall within the prohibition set
down by the Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States :"
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent
were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding
liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highway to
the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
Justice Jackson balanced the protection of those rights guaranteed to
an individual under the Constitution of the United States with the interest
of society as a whole in adequate enforcement of the criminal laws. He
would not sanction the stopping of vehicles at a general roadblock unless
the crime was of such magnitude that the interest of society in adequate
enforcement of the criminal law must prevail. The vicinity within which
roadblocks could be established would depend on the circumstances of the
particular case. A general roadblock might be justified in the case of kid-
napping, murder and armed robbery; but it would not be permissible
where crimes of a lesser magnitude, such as the transportation of illegal
liquor or the violation of state vehicle or driver licensing regulations,
were involved. This rationale is contra to the holding of Judge Kaufman
in the Bonanno case' where he allowed a general roadblock for the pur-
pose of questioning those leaving a gathering of known criminals. A gen-
eral roadblock in such a case would violate constitutional limitations and
be an illegal restraint, even though there may be no arrest.
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
ON THE RIGHT TO STOP A VEHICLE IN MONTANA
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, sections 32-21-155'* and 94-6030"
cover the stopping of vehicles to check fqr unsafe conditions and the fail-
ure to be equipped as required by law. The scope of the authority granted
under section 94-6030 goes far beyond the mere checking of unsafe condi-
tions and the failure to be equipped as required by law, while section
32-21-155 is limited to these specific situations. Section 32-21-155 provides
that a vehicle may be stopped when there is reasonable cause to believe
"Supra note 2 at 154.
'Supra note 27.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 32-21-155: "The supervisor, members of the state highway patrol,
and such other officers and employees of the department as the supervisor may
designate, may at any time upon reasonable cause to believe that a vehicle is un-
safe or not equipped as required by law, or that its equipment is not in proper ad-justment or repair, require the driver of such vehicle to stop and submit such
vehicle to an inspection and such test with reference thereto as may be appropriate."
(Emphasis supplied.)
.C.M. 1947, 94-6030: "The duly elected or appointed law enforcement officers of
this state, and their deputies, are hereby authorized to establish . . . temporary
roadblocks on the highways of this state for the purpose of identifying drivers, and
apprehending persons wanted for violations of the laws of this state, or of any
other state, or of the United States, who are using the highways of this state."
[Vol. 24,
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that the vehicle is unsafe or not equipped as required by law. This statute
is an extension of the holding of the Carrol case.'8 The stopping is not
necessarily an arrest of the driver but rather an investigation of the
vehicle. This statute does not prohibit the stopping of a vehicle on the
basis of reasonable grounds for investigation when checking on other types
of criminal activity. The policy considerations in the two areas are en-
tirely different. In the area of safety the concern is for protection of
those who use the highways of this state and the legislature has required
reasonable cause. Regarding prevention of other types of criminal activi-
ty, the legislature has not placed such a limitation on the power of the law
enforcement officials.
Section 94-6030 seemingly sanctions the stopping of all vehicles on the
mere chance that a violation of the law might be discovered." This is not
constitutionally permissible.' There is no requirement of probable cause
or reasonable grounds for investigation. In view of the policy of the legis-
lature as to the stopping of a single vehicle for a safety check,' section
94-6030 can not be held to have been enacted for such a purpose.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATIVE TO
THE RIGHT TO STOP AND QUESTION
Professor Warner, who was largely responsible for the drafting of
the Uniform Arrest Act, made inquiries of many judges, prosecutors and
police officers and spent about a week each in Boston, Chicago, Los An-
geles, San Francisco and Portland, Oregon, riding around in squad cars
and watching the police at work. ' He stated that he observed "very
few police practices that did not seem to have a good deal of justification,
but a large number that were illegal. "" It is a common practice for police
to stop suspects on the street for the purpose of questioning." He points
out that the law of arrest is completely outdated and that if we expect the
police to respect the law and still perform their duty of protecting the
public, we must revise the law of arrest so that as a practical matter it can
be obeyed.' Continued violations of the law, even in unimportant details,
is calculated to breed disrespect for law and to create a standard of con-
duct based on other principles.'
The right of an officer to stop and question was an established right
at common law."m Considering the simple society of yesterday, the need
for such a right today is even more apparent in view of our highly com-
plex and mobile society.
'Supra note 2.
"Supra note 47.
'Supra note 44 and corresponding text.
"Supra note 46.
5Warner, Investigating the Law of Arrest, 26 A.B.A.J. 151, 153 (1940).
6Ibid.
"
9Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. Rv. 1182.
'Warner, supra note 52 at 155.
6Ibid.
u'2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown; 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown; cited In Warner, The
Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 318-19 (1942).
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RIGHT TO SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST
As has already been pointed out, the courts have refused to allow the
inspection of drivers' licenses to be employed ". . . as a surreptitious sub-
terfuge for embarrassing a motorist and making a detailed search of his
automobile .... "' This is the generally accepted rule with regard to an
arrest for any traffic violation.'1 As the California court in People v.
Blodgett' stated :'
The cab driver could have been arrested for illegal parking, but
a search could not be justified on this ground as it would have no
reasonable relation to the arrest for a traffic violation.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the legality of a
search incident to an arrest depends on the reasonableness of the search
under the circumstances.'
Thus we are presented with the problem of what right to search a
police officer has when he stops a vehicle for a traffic violation. It would
appear that under such circumstances there is no right to search. An ar-
rest for a traffic violation would furnish no reasonable grounds for or
bear any reasonable relation to a search of the automobile. But if, while
in the process of arresting the traffic violator, the police officer observes
an offense being committed in his presence,' he may arrest the offender
for such offense and conduct such a search of the vehicle as is reasonable
in. relation to the crime and the circumstances." It has been held that if
the original stopping of the vehicle was a mere subterfuge to examine the
car by sight inspection, then even if there is an offense being committed
in the presence of the officer, the arrest is illegal and any evidence ob-
tained is illegally obtained evidence.'
The right to search a vehicle on reasonable cause should not be con-
fused with the right to search the vehicle incident to an arrest made on
the basis of reasonable cause. The two are distinct. The right to search
a vehicle on reasonable cause may be independent of the right to arrest;
hence, an arrest need not precede the search.' The probable cause which
forms the basis for an arrest may in many instances be the same as that
which serves as the basis of probable cause for a search.' In this case the
search could be substantiated as being incident to a lawful arrest or on the
basis of probable cause. If the search goes beyond the bounds of that
which would be reasonable in connection with a lawful arrest, it may be
substantiated on the basis of probable cause.
"Supra note 39 and corresponding text.
'*People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956) ; Aronovitz v. City of Miami,
114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959) ; Cf., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932);
People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955) ; Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203,
116 S.W.2d 1009 (1938).
'Supra note 59.6nId. at 58.
'United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
6Supra note 14.
Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1961) ; People v. Murphy, 173 Cal.
App. 2d 367, 343 P.2d 273 (1959) ; People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57(1956).
05Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947).
"Carroll v. United States, supra note 2; Brinegar v. United States, upra note 42.
wPeople v. Lujan, 141 Cal. App. 2d 143, 296 P.2d 93 (1956).
[Vol. 24,
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 24 [1962], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol24/iss2/3
If the probable cause necessary for a valid arrest exists, it makes no
difference whether the search is made before or after the arrest tech-
nically occurs.' This position is supported by the decision of the Montana
Supreme Court in State ex rel. Wong You v. District Court." In that
case the officer searched the gambling establishment of the arrestee before
he technically placed him under arrest. The arrestee was present at all
times'during the search and probable cause on which an arrest could have
been based was present before the search occurred.
CONCLUSION
The basic principle underlying the problems presented is that what
constitutes an allowable interference with personal liberty should be de-
termined by weighing the public interest to be served against the degree
of interference, rather than by matching the facts against a rigid category
called "arrest." Factors to be considered include possible harm to the
public if detention is not accomplished, necessity of immediate detention,
degree of interference and duration of the interference with personal
liberty.
In accordance with this principle and the case law, the following
general principles are submitted. On the basis of reasonable grounds for
investigation, the right to stop and question individuals abroad, as an act
separate from an arrest, is a permissible interference with an individual's
freedom of movement. Such questioning can continue for only a short
period of time and must be done in a proper manner. The potential ar-
restee cannot be required to accompany the police officer anywhere and
if probable cause for an arrest does not become immediately apparent, the
individual must be allowed to proceed. Whether reasonable grounds for
investigation exist is a factual question and must be left to the court's
determination under the facts of each particular case. This rule should
also apply to the stopping of a vehicle. The extreme mobility of a vehicle
is an additional factor which illustrates the need for such a right.
A general roadblock may only be established in attempting to appre-
hend those who have committed a serious crime. This does not mean that
a general roadblock may be established &n the chance of finding someone
who has committed a serious crime. There must be some reasonable rela-
tion between the commission of the crime and the establishment and loca-
tion of the roadblock. Although it has been held that a general roadblock
may be established for the purpose of checking drivers' licenses," it is sub-
mitted that a statute authorizing such a roadblock is unconstitutional. It
constitutes an unreasonable interference with an individual's freedom of
movement.
Section 94-6030 permits the establishment of a roadblock on the mere
chance that some violation of the law will be discovered. It is not limited
as set forth above. Section 94-6030 is an unreasonable interference with
personal freedom of movement and should be declared unconstitutional.
RICHARD J. ANDRIOLO
"People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955) ; Husty v. United States, 282
U.S. 694 (1931).
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